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INTRODuCTION
Initially, from mid-2007 to mid-2008 when the current global crisis was only financial, the transition countries of Central Eastern Europe -regardless of EU or EMU membership -seemed to be fairly resilient. The subprime loans crisis that hit the United States and global intermediaries did not affect them directly. Then, the indirect effects of the growing financial crisis on liquidity and on asset values began to be felt. A lagged slowdown began to reduce the sustained growth rates experienced until then. The crisis of mid-September 2008 triggered by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy began to spread across countries, impacting exchange rates and investment in the corporate sector. By end-2008/mid-2009, when consumption also began to be affected, economic activity in transition economies deteriorated much faster, from slowdown to rapid decline.
PERFORMANCE AND FORECASTS: FROM BAD TO WORSE
On 7 May 2009 the EBRD -European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, founded in 1991 to assist the post-socialist transition of Central-Eastern Europe -published their latest forecasts for [2009] [2010] 1 for all the 28 transition countries where it operates, plus Turkey, which was added in October 2008).
On average, in these 29 countries the EBRD forecasts a 5 per cent contraction in real GNP. Such a nosedive comes after the growth slowdown from 6.9 per cent in 2007 to 4.2 per cent in 2008, and is followed by a modest recovery of 1.4 per cent in 2010, mostly in the second half of the year. The peak of unemployment is yet to come. These forecasts are much more pessimistic than the EBRD's own forecast of January 2009, of imperceptible but positive growth at 0.1 per cent, itself a significant deterioration with respect to the November 2008 forecasts of 3.0 per cent growth, which in turn had been slashed from 5.7 in May 2008. The EBRD is an institution suffering from three existential problems. It is supposed to lend to the private sector in transition economies, at commercial rates, but if it does this its existence does not make any difference. It is a public financial institution whose raison d'être is the inefficiency of public financial institutions. And we will know that it has fulfilled its mission only if and when it is liquidated. In fact, before the crisis, the EBRD government-shareholders (about 60 in number) were considering reducing the scale of its activity -perhaps also because of the EBRD's own over-generous assessment of transition progress in its yearly Transition Reports. Now the Bank "could be set for a big increase of its €20bn capital to help deal with the economic crisis" because of both the envisaged large scale of the recession in its countries of operation, and the need to fill the gap abruptly left by the drop in current capital inflows into the area 5 .
The case for capital increase was greatly strengthened by the publication -just before the EBRD Annual Meeting held in London on 15-16 May 2009 -of the forecasts reported above. But there is no reason to believe that the pessimism of those forecasts was exaggerated in order to strengthen the case for the Bank's capital increase. EBRD Chief Economist Erik Berglof says that "There are downside risks to these predictions. But now there is also upside potential. Our underlying outlook assumes continued external engagement, particularly from the western parents of banks in the region." 6 Such an engagement on the part of foreign parent banks in the area is an over-optimistic assumption (see below). If anything, the withdrawal of foreign parent banks from transition economies (see below, point 4.5) is precisely what strengthens the case for an EBRD major capital increase in the near future, before the review of the EBRD capital due in 2012. In any case, the latest set of forecasts available at the time of writing In general the current financial crisis confronted all emerging and developing countries -including transition economies -with two shocks: "a 'sudden stop' of capital inflows driven by global deleveraging, and a collapse in export demand associated with the global slump" 8 . But there are different aspects and intensities, specific to country groups, discussed both in the IMF Staff Position Note just quoted and in other papers 9 .
SPECIFIC FEATuRES

Home made sub-primes
The USA sub-primes crisis of August 2007 touched only marginally the transition economies. But a large amount of domestic loans, mostly for house-purchase finance but also in the enterprise sector -and in the government sector -were originally denominated in foreign currency because the national currency a) involved much higher interest rates and b) had been stable or (with the exception of countries with a successful Currency Board: Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania) appreciating. All these loans, amounting to $250 billion in Central Eastern Europe 10 promptly became sub-prime, as soon as the domestic currency began to depreciate for the reasons indicated below. Thus Polish borrowers in Swiss Francs in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 have seen their zloty liabilities rise by 31 per cent due to the revaluation of the SF with respect to the Polish zloty.
Auer and Wehrmuller
11 estimate that in the 10 EU member states from Central Europe total losses from private and public debt re-valuation amount to about $60bn, under 5 per cent of GDP in most countries but as much as 18 per cent and 8 per cent in Hungary and Poland respectively. The expectation that the state will ultimately bear the cost of bailing out the debtors, plus the cost born by the state on its own debt, has dramatically raised the spread on Credit Default Swaps for the eight out of the ten new Member States for which data are available.
The problem is serious: in 2007 in eight countries -Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia -the foreign currency-denominated debt in the non-financial private sector exceeded 50% of total non-financial sector debt. In Hungary, Georgia and Estonia it was over 60% and in Latvia almost 90% 12 . Sustained current account deficits lead naturally to higher external debt. But it cannot be argued that the current account deficits were the result of fiscal profligacy.
Between 2000 and 2008 the number of countries running a government surplus increased from one (Russia) to five (with the addition of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan), while the deficits of another 13 countries out of the twenty reviewed by Connolly fell below 3 per cent. Thus on average growth of external debt is clearly due primarily to the private sector. Yet the expected emergence of contingent liabilities and costly bail-outs reduces governments' credibility anyway. Darvas and Pisani-Ferry 13 establish a significant correlation between the cost of credit default swaps (CDS), the insurance against default on government debt, and current account deficits. Moreover, non-Eurozone members pay a higher insurance cost, rising very much faster over time: "the crisis management in the euro area has had the unintended consequence of putting non euro-area new member states at a disadvantage". Probably, without the credibility bestowed by the euro, floating rates lead to overshooting devaluation, while fixed rates lose competitiveness to the country that maintains them and provide adverse shocks when the peg sooner or later has to be altered.
Terms of Trade
Primary product exporters -primarily Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstanwere in position until mid-2008 to run current account surpluses and accumulate foreign reserves. But in 2008 oil, gas, cotton and metals fell in price. Foreign reserves were used -to some extent wasted, we could say-to support overvalued exchange rates and to bail out financial institutions and productive enterprises. Particularly affected are the countries with large current account deficits -many of which had asset price and credit booms" 15 . Transition economies had been able to attract large and growing capital inflows thanks to privatisations at attractive prices, high interest rates net of devaluation cover or even plus revaluations, and production de-localisation thanks to low wages. These attractions have weakened, and the recession has made inflows even less attractive.
"The region [i.e. Connolly's Emerging Europe defined above] faces an aggregated adjusted gross external financing requirement of approximately $460bn, or around $930bn if short-term is added… The deterioration in the outlook for private capital flows to emerging markets makes 'roll-over' of these loans extremely unlikely, with the Institute of International Finance (IIF) projecting a fall in private capital flows to the region from around $254bn in 2008 to only $30bn in 2009" 16 .
In these circumstances devaluations are unavoidable but steering a course between floating and pegging is hard, as we have seen above. Higher interest rates are unlikely to bring back capital in a recession. Controls on capital flows will at best stop capital flight but not bring it back, and can be counterproductive. Official financing is therefore badly needed, by the IMF in the first instance with doubling access limits, Flexible Credit Lines, and Stand-By arrangements. With additional resources, support for debt re-structuring can come from national governments, for instance by converting foreign currency loans to domestic currency and compensating banks for losses, maybe only partly.
Foreign Banks withdrawing funds
At the inception of the transition an under-capitalised and largely insolvent state banking system was partly cleansed of what today are labelled toxic assets, recapitalised, privatised mostly to foreign banks, and new banks were promoted, also mostly foreign. . Foreign banks were to provide capital and know how, and through access to foreign parent banks provide foreign exchange and access to lending of last resort in the country of origin.
Today the EBRD Chief Economist still relies on "the continued external engagement, particularly from the western parents of banks in the region" (cited above). And Darvas and Pisani-Ferry 18 still argue that "Several factors have mitigated the impact of the crisis on non euro area NMS [New Member States]: … [among other things] western European ownership of NMS banks (by indirectly stabilizing their NMS subsidiaries)…" (emphasis added).
Yet the EC Spring forecasts 2009
19 tell a different story: "The repatriation of capital by foreign banks has been particularly abrupt in some cases. For instance, in Ukraine real GDP growth is projected to decline by 9½% in 2009, due to a severely curtailed access to external financing, which has triggered the conclusion of a stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the IMF…" "The significant and broad-based slowdown in the CIS could have direct growth effects in Central and Eastern Europe, and the presence of EU banks in the region creates further potential negative spill-overs via the financial channel" (emphasis added). "Paradoxically, it is precisely this characteristic -strong foreign banking presence -that renders EE countries (except for the CIS) region, much more vulnerable to the present financial turmoil" 20 . In turn, foreign parent banks risk downgrading as a result of the declining profitability and the losses on their operations in Eastern Europe. while, conversely, EE countries depend on their continued financial health. 
The Impact of the Global Crisis on Transition Economies
Recently the EBRD made one of its larger investments, worth a total of €432.4 million, in UniCredit subsidiaries across eight Eastern European countries, to provide medium and long-term debt and equity financing through UniCredit subsidiaries in support of SMEs, lease finance and energy efficiency projects.
21
This is precisely the kind of contribution that the EBRD can make to the region's recovery, especially if its relatively modest resources of €20bn were to be raised by 50-100 per cent.
Reduction in external demand
Current projections for 2009 indicate for the first time since the last World War a decline in world output (-2 per cent according to the IMF) and a much larger decline in world trade, by as much as 13% (WTO), thus reducing for the first time since WWII the most common measure of globalisation, the ratio between world exports and world GNP. A sizeable de-globalisation episode is taking place. Output contraction and trade are larger in the EU, with which transition economies have grown to be increasingly integrated, with EU trade shares of the order of 60-90 per cent for the New Member States and South-Eastern Europe, all characterised by high foreign trade openness, higher than that of most old members of the EU (see the table below, penultimate column). Such openness makes the transition economies' opportunities of "de-coupling" from downturns in the EU rather limited 22 . Lower trade shares involve a slowdown in manufacturing and extractive industries and in internal demand, especially in construction and financial services.
Differences in initial positions and policy response
"Some [countries] were ripe for a home-grown crisis associated with the end of unsustainable credit booms or fiscal policies; others were just bystanders caught in the storm" 23 .
Uncharacteristically, the IMF has recommended easing monetary policy and lower interest rates to advanced economies experiencing the global recession. It has also 21 "UniCredit is the largest banking group in the central and eastern European region, with over 4,000 branches in 19 countries. The group has invested around €10 billion of equity in central and eastern Europe and has around €85 billion of total customers loans in the region. Beside its own funding programs to its subsidiaries, it cooperates with international institutions including the EBRD in order to ensure continuing support to the local economies during these challenging times. ", http://www.ebrd.com/new/pressrel/2009/090507g.htm. 22 Connolly, op. cit., p.5 23 Ghosh et al (2009) , op. cit., p.3; "… the majority were just innocent bystanders", p.2 "called for a timely, large, lasting, diversified fiscal stimulus that is coordinated across countries with a commitment to do more if the crisis deepens" 24 . The IMF is now forced to recommend the same policies to transition economies in crisis, though with stronger warnings about the possible side effects: "Much of the spending and revenue policy advice for advanced economies remains relevant for EMEs [Emerging Market Economies] , once scaled down for their small fiscal space" (Ibidem, emphasis added).
Thus transition economies and other EMEs are reminded that looser monetary policies involve dangers of exchange rate devaluation and consequent adverse effects on balance sheets and that it is dangerous to exceed the "policy space" and especially the "fiscal space" of a country, jeopardizing policy credibility and sustainability. Changes should be gradual (however strange this may now sound coming from the IMF, especially as regards transition economies) and sustainable; abrupt and non-sustainable changes can be particularly costly and disruptive 25 .
Clearly an expansionary fiscal policy "is likely to be more effective in stimulating aggregate demand if the economy is relatively closed to trade flows, uses monetary policy to prevent or limit the appreciation of the currency, has substantial spare capacity, has a high proportion of credit-constrained households or firms, and has a sustainable public debt position" 26 . Which is fair enough, except that transition economies and other EMEs are most unlikely to satisfy these ideal preconditions.
A SHORT DIGRESSION ON THE EuRO
The question arises whether early membership of the Eurozone might assist recovery in the New Member States, of which only Slovenia and Slovakia are already members. The IMF now recommends it − speaking out of turn as it is not for the IMF to recommend anything to Europe other than possibly an application to join the Eurozone on the part of those new members that meet the Maastricht conditions for membership.
Small open economies would probably gain from being part of a large currency area in times of crisis, although Slovakia (where the euro only became legal tender on 1 January 2009) and the Czech Republic have done rather well outside of it. The EU rules out unilateral adoption of the euro for both members and candidates. The EU could well have admitted at least a few other New Member States to the Eurozone by loosening the Maastricht criteria for fiscal and monetary convergence, and the additional condition of two-year membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II. The Maastricht criteria for fiscal convergence are in theory looser than those of the so-called Growth and Stability Pact (GSP, which involves not only a 3% ceiling to government deficit but a stricter zero per cent over the cycle) and apply to all EU members regardless of Eurozone membership. In practice however the GSP strictures and the associated penalties were considerably relaxed in March 2005 and further loosened during the current crisis, whereas Maastricht criteria for joining the euro have been very strictly enforced. It is unreasonable to subject countries that grow much faster than the Eurozone members and have relatively low ratios between public debt and GNP to the same fiscal stringency as stagnant and highly indebted Eurozone members (like Italy): a fiscal stringency which is, moreover, only applied rigidly and inflexibly to prospective members.
Lithuania was left out of the euro only because its inflation exceeded the average inflation of the three least inflationary EU members by 1.6% instead of the 1.5% prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty -not exactly enlightened or rational behaviour, especially considering that two of those three least inflationary countries were not Eurozone members.
"The EU can certainly be criticised for clinging to criteria ill-suited to catching-up countries and the case for reforming them is strong" (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 2009, cited). 27 Be that as it may, the middle of a recession is not the best time to change or, worse, bend the rules as drastically as it would be required by early admission of all or most New Members to the Eurozone. The first recession in a decade.
CONCLuSIONS
In the 1990s an unexpected, deep and protracted recession characterised the postsocialist transition of Central-Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, with GNP decline ranging from 18 per cent over three years in Poland, to 65 per cent over ten years in Moldova. The decline may be slightly exaggerated especially at the top of the range, for well known reasons, but a reliable and unbiassed observer, Bob Mundell, reckons that the transition recession was not only deeper than the 1929 crisis but also deeper than the recession that accompanied the Black Death in the 14 th century, because then income fall was matched by population fall and living standards were preserved. By comparison the current recession must be barely perceptible to the populations of transition countries. And at least this time they are benefiting not only from more generous assistance from the international community, but from more enlightened policies of monetary easing and low interest rates, fiscal subsidies and expansion, large scale state intervention -all policies diametrically opposite to the draconian hyper-liberal policies that contributed so much to aggravate the transition recession and the other costs of transition in the 1990s. Only two things have really changed since then: today the hyper-liberalism that inspired the course of transition in the 1990s has been thoroughly discredited by the global crisis associated with it, and the predicament of transition economies is vastly improved simply because they happen to share it with the advanced countries that control international financial organisations.
